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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The Nature, Scope, and Impact of Mass-Marketing Fraud 
 
• Mass-marketing fraud has gradually transformed from a predominantly North 
American crime problem into a pervasive global criminal threat. (P. 4) 
 
• There are strong indications that the order of magnitude of global mass-marketing 
fraud losses is in the tens of billions of dollars per year. (P. 5) 
 
• For some victims, the risks extend well beyond loss of personal savings or funds to 
include physical threats or risks, loss of their homes, depression, and even 
contemplated, attempted, or actual suicide.   (P. 7) 
 
• Mass-marketing fraud has a substantial impact on economies and markets by 
undermining consumer trust and confidence in legitimate businesses.  (P. 9) 
 
• Large-scale criminal mass-marketing fraud operations are present in multiple 
countries in most regions of the world.  (P. 9)  Similarities between such operations 
include targeting victims in other countries, foreign outsourcing of operations, and 
involvement of organized criminal enterprises. (Pp. 10-13) 
 
Methods and Techniques of Mass-Marketing Fraud 
 
• As a whole, fraudulent mass-marketing operations are increasingly transnational, 
interconnected, and fluid, with groups shifting alliances according to the particular 
needs of a scheme. (P. 14) 
 
• Fraudulent mass-marketers reach victims via all modes of communication – postal 
service, telephone, e-mail, Internet sites, television, radio, and even in person. (P. 
16) 
 
• Viable mass-marketing fraud groups require a variety of resources to operate, 
including the means to target and communicate with prospective victims, obtain and 
launder illicit proceeds, and evade law enforcement detection and investigation.  
These include legitimate business services, lead lists, communications tools, 
payment processors, fraudulent identification documents, and counterfeit financial 
instruments. (P. 17) 
 
• Mass-marketing fraud criminals continue to use counterfeit financial instruments, 
including checks and money orders, to facilitate many mass-marketing schemes, 
including overpayment, lottery, and employment fraud. (P. 18) 
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• Operators of mass-marketing fraud schemes are highly adaptive, rapidly changing 
their methods and techniques to reduce the risks of law enforcement detection and 
investigation and to respond to consumer and business awareness of their current 
methods.  (P. 19) 
 
• Identity theft and money laundering continue to be critical components of various 
mass-marketing fraud schemes.  (P. 20)  One disturbing trend is the increasing 
exploitation of fraud victims to receive and launder victim funds, or to receive and 
disburse counterfeit financial instruments.  (P. 22) 
 
• While most mass-marketing fraud schemes are nonviolent in nature, law 
enforcement intelligence reveals that some fraud groups employ threats and 
coercive tactics against uncooperative victims, rival groups, and their own group 
members.  (P. 23)  Recent law enforcement intelligence suggests that use of mass-
marketing related intra- and inter-group violence is on the rise in some places, such 
as Jamaica, Nigeria, and the United States.  (P. 23) 
 
Conclusion 
 
• To counter the threat of mass-marketing fraud effectively, investigative, law 
enforcement, and regulatory authorities in multiple countries – whether those 
countries are used as bases of operations for mass-marketing fraud schemes, targets 
of such schemes, or both -- will need to pursue five approaches in close 
coordination.  Those include (1) expansion of their capability to gather and share 
intelligence on all aspects of mass-marketing fraud schemes and their key 
participants; (2) development and expansion of capacities for disruption of the 
operations of mass-marketing fraud schemes through lawful means (e.g., seizure of 
counterfeit financial instruments and documents used in such schemes); (3) 
expansion of public awareness and education programs to help individuals and 
businesses more readily recognize solicitations by mass-marketing fraud schemes 
and take action to avoid or minimize losses to such schemes; (4) development of 
effective measures to more promptly identify and support victims of mass-
marketing fraud schemes through public- and private-sector resources; and (5) 
development and expansion of coordinated efforts among investigative, law 
enforcement, and regulatory agencies to use their enforcement powers against major 
mass-marketing fraud schemes. (Pp. 24-25)  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Mass-marketing fraud is a term increasingly used around the world to refer to fraud 
schemes that use mass-communications media – including telephones, the Internet, mass 
mailings, television, radio, and even personal contact – to contact, solicit, and obtain 
money, funds, or other items of value  from multiple victims in one or more jurisdictions.  
Although law enforcement and regulatory authorities often use a variety of names to refer 
to the phenomenon – including “advance-fee fraud,” “419 fraud,” “Internet fraud,” and 
“telemarketing fraud” – the growing profusion of labels for these fraud schemes tends to 
obscure the fact that such schemes often are conducted using multiple communications 
channels to identify and contact victims, as well as identical or highly similar methods of 
operation that are not dependent on a single communications medium. 
 
Today, mass-marketing fraud schemes operate from, and increasingly seek to target victims 
in, numerous countries on multiple continents. Moreover, such schemes are aware and take 
advantage of differences between countries in legislative authorities prohibiting such 
schemes.  As a consequence, mass-marketing fraud has become a substantial concern for 
law enforcement in several regions of the world. 
 
The International Mass-Marketing Fraud Working Group (IMMFWG) prepared this threat 
assessment to provide governments and the public with a current assessment of the nature 
and scope of the threat that mass-marketing fraud poses around the world.  The IMMFWG, 
which was established in September 2007, consists of law enforcement, regulatory, and 
consumer protection agencies from seven countries, including Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
the Netherlands, Nigeria, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as Europol.  
The IMMFWG seeks to facilitate the multinational exchange of information and 
intelligence, the coordination of cross-border operations to detect, disrupt, and apprehend 
mass-marketing fraud, and the enhancement of public-awareness and public-education 
measures concerning international mass-marketing fraud schemes. 
 
The information and analysis in this assessment is current through May 2010, and are 
derived principally from public and non-public law enforcement and non-law enforcement 
sources in Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. 
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I. THE NATURE, SCOPE, AND IMPACT OF MASS-MARKETING FRAUD 
Over the last two decades, according to law enforcement authorities in multiple countries, 
mass-marketing fraud has gradually transformed from a predominantly North American 
crime problem into a pervasive global criminal threat.  This section of the Threat 
Assessment discusses the current scope and scale of mass-marketing fraud as a crime 
problem. The available evidence indicates that mass-marketing fraud schemes generate 
losses estimated at tens of billions of dollars each year from millions of individuals and 
businesses around the world.  These schemes typically benefit members of criminal 
organizations and groups, while devastating the lives and financial well-being of victims 
and their families. 
 
The Nature of Mass-Marketing Fraud 
 
Mass-marketing fraud – whether committed via the Internet, telemarketing “boiler rooms,” 
the mail, television or radio advertising, mass meetings, or even one-on-one talks over 
people’s kitchen tables1
 
 -- has two elements in common.  First, the criminals who conduct 
any mass-marketing fraud scheme aim to defraud multiple individuals or businesses to 
maximize their criminal revenues.  Second, the schemes invariably depend on persuading 
victims to transfer money or funds to the criminals based on promises of valuable goods, 
services, or benefits, then never delivering the promised goods, services, or benefits to the 
victims. 
Today, law enforcement officials see a broader array of mass-marketing fraud schemes than 
ever before, using a variety of “pitches” (explanations of promised goods, services, or 
benefits) such as lottery or sweepstakes winnings, investment or business opportunities, 
schemes that involve use of counterfeit checks, and “romance” schemes in which victims 
are made to believe that the persons contacting them have sincere romantic feelings for 
them. (A more extensive list of mass-marketing fraud schemes can be found in the 
Appendix.)  
Mass-Marketing Fraud Losses 
 
At present, there are no comprehensive and authoritative statistical data regarding the scope 
of mass-marketing fraud on a global level.  A number of countries – notably, Belgium, 
Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States -- currently operate or 
are developing national mass-marketing fraud and/or Internet fraud reporting centers.  Even 
so, many mass-marketing fraud victims who try to report their losses typically direct their 
complaints to countless private sector companies and local, state, provincial, national, and 
international law enforcement agencies.  This substantially hinders efforts to track fraud 
losses and determine victimization rates.2
Furthermore, many victims who lose money to mass-marketing fraud do not contact 
authorities or reporting centers.  Their reasons range from shame, embarrassment, and 
perceptions of law enforcement inaction to fear of being prosecuted for participating in 
schemes to embezzle funds from companies and countries.  Elderly victims, in particular, 
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often may be unable or unwilling to report due to diminished mental faculties or fear of 
losing financial independence should their families discover the fraud.  While it is 
impossible to know how many victims fail to report fraud, the number is likely substantial.  
Belgium has estimated that unreported mass-marketing fraud incidents likely exceed the 
official national average of 66 percent for all crimes.  A 2007 Canadian consumer fraud 
survey found that almost nine in ten victims do not report fraudulent solicitations.3  The 
United Kingdom’s Office of Fair Trading offers a starker estimate, suggesting that fewer 
than five percent of people report fraudulent 
solicitations to appropriate authorities.4
Nonetheless, from analysis of consumer fraud 
surveys and other data, including fraud complaint 
data and extrapolations from data in various 
schemes uncovered by law enforcement, there are 
strong indications that the order of magnitude of 
global mass-marketing fraud losses is in the tens of 
billions of dollars per year: 
  
 
• Fraud Surveys. A 2006 United Kingdom Office of Fair Trading (OFT) study 
estimated that each year 3.2 million United Kingdom adults (6.5 percent of the adult 
population) fall victim to mass-marketing schemes, collectively losing £3.5 billion.5  
Similarly, a June 2008 study by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) found that 
in 2007, 806,000 Australians aged 15 years and over (5 percent of the population) 
were victims of at least one incident of personal fraud in the preceding 12 months, 
including selected schemes such as lottery, pyramid, and phishing schemes, and that 
453,100 of those victims (56.2 percent) reportedly lost AU $977 million (US $905.7 
million as of June 27, 2008).6
 
 
While there is no comparable survey of adult U.S. fraud victims limited to mass-
marketing fraud, a 2005 survey by the United States Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) estimated that 30.2 million consumers (13.5 percent of U.S. adults) may have 
been victims of various consumer fraud schemes (including foreign lottery and 
prize-promotion schemes) during the preceding year.7  Extrapolations from the 
percentages of Australian and United Kingdom adults victimized by fraud and their 
reported losses would indicate that an equivalent percentage of U.S. adults would 
lose approximately $23 to $25 billion a year to mass-marketing fraud.8
 
  While 
Belgium has not conducted a recent fraud survey, Belgian police have analyzed 
cases in a national police database and extrapolated, based on estimated failure-to-
report rates, that Belgian victims of Internet fraud may have lost more than €10 
million in 2008. 
• Complaint Data.  In a February 2010  report of complaints that it received in 2009 
through its Consumer Sentinel network, stated that a total of 630,604 complaints 
reported total consumer fraud losses of more than $1.7 billion (i.e., $1,715,973,109), 
with an average loss of $2,721.  Although the total consumer fraud loss reported to 
the FTC in 2008 was slightly higher at more than $1.8 billion (i.e., $1,835,032,926), 
the number of victims reporting losses was significantly smaller than the number in 
There are strong 
indications that the order 
of magnitude of global 
mass-marketing fraud 
losses is in the tens of 
billions of dollars per 
year. 
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2009 (i.e., 539,657 in 2008 versus 630,604 
in 2009).9
fraud losses.
  One indication that these data 
reflect losses from mass-marketing fraud 
schemes is the remarkable statement that in 
2009, 117 consumers reported to the FTC 
that they had paid $1 million or more in 
10  As points of comparison, the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre received 
more than 40,000 complaints and documented reported fraud losses of nearly CA $ 
59.3 million in 2009,11 and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
received more than 20,000 scam-related complaints and inquiries in 2009, with 
aggregate reported losses of AU $69.9 million.12
 
   
Law enforcement and regulatory authorities acknowledge that the actual numbers of 
mass-marketing fraud victims and losses vastly exceed those reported to law 
enforcement and consumer protection agencies.  In addition to the 2005 FTC survey 
mentioned above, a 2007 study commissioned by the Competition Bureau of 
Canada concluded that nearly 60 percent of the population, or approximately 15 
million adult Canadians, had been the target of a mass-marketing scheme in the 
prior 12 months.13
 
 
• Law Enforcement Actions.  Various law enforcement actions around the world 
have found mass-marketing fraud operations that each generate hundreds of millions 
of dollars or more in fraud losses.  These include: 
 
 Money-Transfer Schemes.  In July 2009, in a series of coordinated raids, 
Thai law enforcement authorities arrested 94 individuals, operating out of 11 
rented homes in Chiang Mai, who conducted an international money-transfer 
scheme that was estimated to have taken in more than $710 million.14
 
 
 Ponzi and Investment Schemes.  Numerous Ponzi schemes (schemes in 
which fraudsters use funds paid by later victims to pay a portion of funds to 
earlier victims) and pyramid schemes in addition to the Bernard Madoff 
scheme have reportedly taken in billions of dollars in investor funds.  One 
study by the Associated Press reported finding more than 150 Ponzi schemes 
that collapsed in 2009 alone, resulting in $16.5 billion in losses.15  In April 
2010, for example, a U.S. federal judge sentenced a Minnesota businessman 
to 50 years imprisonment for conducting a $3.7 billion Ponzi scheme whose 
victims included hedge funds, pastors, and retirees.16  Other U.S. defendants 
recently have pleaded guilty to charges stemming from operation of Ponzi 
schemes that ranged as high as $1.2 billion.17  In an entirely separate case, an 
Australian businessman was sought for arrest in connection with his alleged 
conduct of a Ponzi scheme that took in more than US $1.2 billion.18
 
 
One factor that appears likely to keep victim losses higher is the practice of many mass-
marketing fraud schemes to target their victims for revictimization, either through further 
requests for funds in the same scheme or through later solicitations in which the fraudsters 
In 2009, 117 U.S. 
consumers reported that 
they each had lost $1 
million or more to fraud. 
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falsely claim that they are affiliated with law enforcement or the legal system and can help 
victims obtain the funds they previously lost. The 2006 OFT study concluded that mass-
marketing fraud victims have a 30 percent chance of falling victim to a second fraudulent 
solicitation within 12 months of the initial incident, likely because their names are included 
on fraudsters’ lists of individuals susceptible to deceptive solicitations.  A 2003 survey by 
the AARP (formerly known as the American Association of Retired Persons) found that the 
risk of revictimization varies by fraud type: half of the lottery fraud victims and 27 percent 
of the investment fraud victims interviewed for the survey indicated they had experienced 
at least one additional instance of fraud within the prior three years.19
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial losses, however, do not fully reflect all of the costs that mass-marketing fraud 
victims often bear.  For some victims, the risks extend well beyond loss of personal savings 
or funds to include physical risks, loss of their homes, depression, and even contemplated, 
attempted, or actual suicide: 
 
• Physical Risks. Although it is not widely recognized, some mass-marketing fraud 
victims find themselves subject to physical threats or risks stemming directly from 
their contact with the schemes.  In recent years, law enforcement agencies have 
even documented several incidents in which mass-marketing fraud victims were 
induced to travel to various African countries, then kidnapped and held for 
ransom.20  In 2008, for example, a Japanese businessman who believed that he was 
placing money into an investment opportunity traveled to South Africa, where he 
was kidnapped and held for $5 million ransom.  Ultimately, one South African 
national and six Nigerian nationals were arrested for the kidnapping.21
 
 
In addition, in some cases after the victim has admitted to a family member how 
much money they have lost, the victim may also become a victim of physical abuse: 
Arrests of Alleged Participants in Chiang Mai Money-Transfer Scheme 
[Source: Chiang Mai Mail]  
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 A 52 year old woman in the United States lost more than $44,000 to an 
inheritance scheme operated out of the Netherlands. As a result of losing the 
$44,000, she was physically abused by her husband and eventually fled the 
home. 
 
• Loss of Home.  Law enforcement and regulatory investigations have periodically 
found cases in which mass-marketing fraud victims either mortgage their homes to 
make payments to the fraud scheme or are forced to sell their homes to satisfy 
outstanding debts.  Here are two examples, drawn from recent mass-marketing fraud 
investigations: 
 
 A 67 year old man in the United States lost more than $570,000 to an 
inheritance scam. The man, who was college-educated and owned his own 
company, sent money to Belgium, Germany, the Ivory Coast, the Netherlands, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom.  In particular, he traveled to Amsterdam, where 
he was shown a trunk of money, was given a few bills which were good, and 
became convinced the funds were real.  As a result of his losses, the man lost his 
life savings, his business, and his home, filed for bankruptcy, had to return to his 
native country to live with his relatives, and is being treated for depression. 
 
 A 76 year old man in the United States lost $87,000 of his personal funds to an 
inheritance scheme.  After depleting his savings account to pay the required 
advance “fees,” the man received “loans” in the form of counterfeit checks 
mailed from Canada to pay for additional nonexistent “fees.” The face amounts 
of the counterfeit checks totaled $482,466.  After he deposited the checks and 
remitted funds back to the fraudsters, his bank placed liens on his bank accounts 
and his residence.  In the course of the scheme he sent money to Canada, Japan, 
the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.  Ultimately the man lost his residence 
to foreclosure and he is now living on Social Security payments. 
  
• Depression.  When mass-marketing fraud schemes cause substantial losses to 
victims, victims often have reported that they find the losses emotionally 
devastating. The stress and pain of victimization may manifest themselves as 
depression, withdrawal and isolation from family and friends, difficulty at work, and 
the deterioration of physical and mental health. 
 
• Contemplated, Attempted, or Actual Suicide.  For some time, law enforcement 
investigators have handled mass-marketing fraud cases in which at least one victim 
who had suffered devastating financial losses had committed or admitted having 
considered suicide.  Although there is no systematic means of gathering such 
information from previous cases, an ongoing survey by the Working Group has 
been able to document at least 27 cases of mass-marketing fraud victims in various 
countries who had considered, attempted, or committed suicide since January 1, 
2006 as a result of their fraud losses.  Here are a few examples of those cases: 
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 A 56-year-old woman who lived in the United States committed suicide in 2006 
after becoming a victim of a lottery fraud scheme and sending the scheme more 
than $400,000.  The woman, a college graduate, reportedly responded to an 
email solicitation, then sent various wire transfers to individuals located in 
Amsterdam. 
  
 A husband and wife, both 65 years old, who live in the United Kingdom have 
together lost more than $2.7 million dollars to an inheritance scam being 
operated out of China, the Netherlands, and Spain.  The couple used their life 
savings, re-financed their home, and withdrew retirement funds to pay for the 
advance fees that the scheme charged.  As a result of the losses, the wife has 
attempted suicide twice.  Currently the couple is in the process of losing their 
home to foreclosure and is being treated for depression. 
 
 A retirement-age man who lives in Australia lost more than $6.1 million to an 
investment scheme.  The man, who had been a successful businessman before 
the fraud, eventually admitted to authorities that he could no longer walk to the 
bus stop in his neighborhood because each time he did so he felt a temptation to 
step in front of an oncoming bus. 
 
Finally, mass-marketing fraud has a substantial impact on economies and markets by 
undermining consumer trust and confidence in legitimate businesses.  The Office of Fair 
Trading reports that “more than half of [United Kingdom] scam victims admitted to having 
changed their purchasing and payment behavior, generally becoming more cautious or 
suspicious of any contact that could potentially be another scam.”22
The Global Scope of Mass-Marketing Fraud 
 In contrast, less than a 
quarter of respondents who had been targeted but not defrauded by fraudulent solicitations 
claimed to have changed their behavior. Approximately 15 percent of all respondents 
indicated that they had reduced their online shopping.  A small number of victims also 
claimed that they were more likely to limit their use of credit cards, dispose of unsolicited 
mail, and ignore cold callers and unsolicited offers. 
 
Over time, mass-marketing fraud has developed 
into a global crime problem.  Today, large-scale 
criminal mass-marketing fraud operations are 
present in multiple countries in most regions of 
the world.  Recent law enforcement investigations 
have exposed such schemes operating not only in 
multiple countries in North America, Europe, and 
Africa, but in other countries and jurisdictions as 
diverse as Brazil, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, India, Israel, the Philippines, Thailand, and the 
United Arab Emirates.  
 
Analysis of the fraud operations in these countries increasingly reveals more similarities 
than differences.  Some of the most important similarities are as follows. 
Large-scale criminal 
mass-marketing fraud 
operations are present in 
multiple countries in 
most regions of the 
world. 
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• Targeting of Victims in Other Countries.  Intelligence suggests that numerous 
mass-marketing fraud operations on multiple continents attempt to evade detection 
and identification by targeting victims in other countries.23
 
 
 Africa.  Although the global proliferation of autonomous West African fraud 
groups has altered, to varying degrees, Nigeria’s role as an epicenter of 
fraudulent operations, a home to criminal kingpins, and a destination for illicit 
proceeds, Nigeria continues to serve as a base of operations for a wide range of 
mass-marketing activity.  Recent law enforcement intelligence indicates that 
Nigeria-based fraudsters conduct international advance-fee schemes, black 
money schemes targeting Middle Eastern victims, and the fraudulent purchase 
of merchandise via the Internet.  In addition to overseas victims, Nigeria-based 
mass-marketers increasingly target middle- and upper-class citizens of Nigeria 
and nearby African countries. 
 
At the same time, mass-marketing fraud has expanded into numerous quarters of 
sub-Saharan Africa.  In recent years, law enforcement investigations have 
uncovered new mass-marketing fraud operations in Benin, Cote D’Ivoire, 
Ghana, South Africa, Togo, and Uganda, from which locations perpetrators are 
conducting 419 schemes and producing counterfeit checks.  Law enforcement 
investigations have determined that large numbers of local Ghanaian youngsters 
participate in fraud schemes that target foreign victims.  In January 2009 
Ghanaian authorities estimated that the Ghana Post was seizing and destroying 
as many as 1,000 mass-marketing fraud letters each day, the majority destined 
for individuals in the United Kingdom and the United States.  In addition, in 
March 2010 Chinese media reported the arrest of nine Cameroonians who had 
obtained nearly $40,000 from a Fujian province resident who had been 
contacted by fraudsters through a dating website.24
 
 
 Asia: In November 2009, Thai police arrested four Chinese nationals based in 
Bangkok who used both telemarketing and the Internet to defraud Chinese and 
Taiwanese residents out of nearly $1 million. The fraudsters reportedly called 
their intended victims, pretending to be Taiwanese Interpol authorities and 
prosecutors, and told them told their bank accounts could be seized by 
authorities after they were caught up in a fraud scheme.  Victims were told that 
to avoid having their money seized, they should transfer their money to bank 
accounts in Thailand.  The scheme also reportedly faxed to victims copies of a 
fake arrest warrant issued by a Taipei court in order to intimidate them.25
 
 
 Australia/New Zealand: Both Australia and New Zealand are targeted by mass-
marketing fraud schemes operating from Europe and Africa for online lottery, 
car-sales, and counterfeit-check fraud schemes.26  The Queensland Police 
Service recently reported that residents of that state were sending between AU 
$800,000 and $1 million per month to fraud schemes in Nigeria.27  Both 
countries also are home to fraudulent boiler rooms that conduct lottery, 
sweepstakes, and other prize-related schemes targeting victims overseas. 
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 Caribbean: Law enforcement intelligence and reporting by Jamaican news 
outlets document the rising popularity of lottery fraud schemes targeting U.S. 
residents among Kingston- and Montego Bay-based criminal enterprises.  These 
operations are using police corruption, murder, kidnappings, robberies, and 
other violent tactics to discourage rival groups, compete for proceeds and lists of 
potential victims, and expand their operations.28
 
 
 Europe: Intelligence from a number of law enforcement agencies indicates that 
mass-marketing fraud operations weave their way through multiple European 
countries.  A United Kingdom law enforcement investigation found that a Spain-
based boiler room operated largely by British expatriates, which solicits victims 
to purchase worthless or low-value US securities, has defrauded more than 
15,000 citizens of the United Kingdom and other countries of more than £35 
million. In addition, since 2003 the Spanish National Police, working with U.S. 
authorities, have arrested more than 400 individuals and identified more than 
400 bank accounts used to perpetrate a fraudulent lottery targeting victims in 
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, and dozens of other 
countries. 
 
Recent intelligence reveals that similar lottery fraud groups in Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom continue to contact victims, suggesting 
that the Spanish arrests only temporarily disrupted the fraud networks’ 
operations.  France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom 
also have been identified as hub countries for the flow of counterfeit checks and 
fraudulent mailings; indeed, authorities estimate that approximately 40,000 
fraudulent letters leave Spain each day en route to victims around the world.  
Finally, Eastern Europe, and Romania in particular, has emerged as an epicenter 
of Internet-based mass-marketing fraud and other cyber crimes, spurred in part 
by stagnant economies and endemic public corruption that provide limited 
opportunities for legitimate employment and enable organized crime to flourish. 
 
 Middle East.  Within the last two years, the Israel National Police, working with 
US law enforcement, have arrested more than 20 Israeli citizens and residents 
for perpetrating lottery fraud schemes that allegedly defrauded elderly US 
residents of $27 million.29
 
 
 North America: In Canada and the United States, boiler rooms and smaller, less-
formal mass-marketing fraud operations solicit Canadian, US, and foreign 
victims with fraudulent offers for medical treatments and cures, illegitimate 
business opportunities, high-risk investments, guaranteed credit cards and 
grants, low-interest loans, and over-priced office directories and supplies.  
Recent investigations have revealed that US-based fraudsters also target 
immigrants with false offers to assist applicants with obtaining legal 
immigration status, employment, and housing in the United States. 
 
 12 
While some schemes are homegrown operations, locations outside North 
America are also popular with foreign fraudsters, who may exploit the host 
nations’ abundance of cheap labor, existing call centers, and new 
communication technologies, such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), to 
disguise the locations from which they are calling.  Indeed, Canadian 
intelligence suggests that aggressive law enforcement actions over the last 
decade have spurred many traditional boiler rooms to relocate to other regions.  
Certain Canadian and U.S. residents are known to have relocated operations to 
Costa Rica and Caribbean locations. 
 
• Foreign Outsourcing of Operations.  Law enforcement intelligence shows that 
fraudulent mass-marketing operations routinely outsource vital business functions, 
such as the printing of lottery mailings, the fulfillment of orders, and the laundering 
of fraud proceeds, to legitimate businesses and criminal enterprises around the 
world.  United Kingdom authorities have identified fraudsters’ use of companies in 
India, France, Germany, Hungary, and 
Morocco to print and bulk ship documents 
into the United Kingdom.  Canadian boiler 
rooms frequently employ U.S.-based 
payment processors, brokers of “lead lists” 
(lists containing identifying data on prior 
fraud victims), and fulfillment centers to 
obtain access to the US banking system, 
target specific types of victims, and 
distribute worthless items that the fraudsters 
have fraudulently sold to consumers.  Recent 
law enforcement investigations have also revealed that West African fraud groups 
routinely contract with Middle Eastern and Asian criminal enterprises to launder the 
proceeds of fraud schemes through the accounts of criminal conspirators, shell 
companies, and legitimate businesses and individuals that temporarily rent their 
accounts to perpetrators. 
 
• Involvement of Organized Criminal Enterprises.  Although mass-marketing fraud, 
as described elsewhere, can be conducted by a single individual or small groups of 
individuals, law enforcement intelligence 
reveals that organized criminal enterprises 
increasingly conduct, facilitate, and profit 
from international mass-marketing fraud 
schemes.  These groups range from 
traditional, highly-structured enterprises, 
such as Cosa Nostra families in North 
America, to loosely-knit ethnic-based 
groups, such as Nigerian and Jamaican 
organizations.  Many of these groups 
Organized criminal 
enterprises increasingly 
conduct, facilitate, and 
profit from international 
mass-marketing fraud 
schemes. 
Fraudulent mass-
marketing operations 
routinely outsource vital 
business functions to 
legitimate businesses 
and criminal enterprises 
around the world.   
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demonstrate international reach, operating from multiple countries and continents 
and relying upon shared ethnic, national, family, tribal, or other ties to engender 
trust and enable cooperation among members for whom no direct connections exist. 
 
The nature and degree of organized crime groups’ involvement in mass-marketing 
fraud vary substantially.  Some groups exercise control over all aspects of a fraud 
operation and other groups outsource or provide specialized support services, 
including mailing counterfeit documents, collecting victims’ payments, hosting 
fraudulent web sites, supplying leads lists, forging identity documents and financial 
instruments, and laundering illicit proceeds.  Organized crime groups are attracted 
to mass-marketing fraud’s comparatively low risk of detection, prosecution, and 
incarceration (compared to other criminal activities), and vast profit potential, which 
may enable the groups to fund other criminal ventures.  Reliable law enforcement 
intelligence indicates that some mass-marketing perpetrators routinely engage in 
other white-collar crime ventures, including government benefit fraud, credit card 
fraud, identity theft, mortgage fraud, and the sale of counterfeit goods.  Less 
substantiated intelligence suggests that some fraud groups are also involved in drugs 
and arms trafficking.   
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II. METHODS AND TECHNIQUES OF MASS-MARKETING FRAUD 
Types and Structures of Fraud Operations 
 
Mass-marketing fraud operations vary widely in size, structure, and complexity.  
Depending on the nature of the scheme, they may range from one- and two-person 
entrepreneurial efforts and loosely-knit online 
groups to sophisticated, hierarchical boiler rooms 
and ethnic-based criminal enterprises.  Despite 
such diversity, law enforcement intelligence 
suggests that, as a whole, fraudulent mass-
marketing operations are increasingly 
transnational, interconnected, and fluid, with 
groups shifting alliances according to the 
particular needs of a scheme. 
 
Mass-marketing fraud boiler rooms tend to be highly-structured and high-pressure business 
operations in which small armies of managers and employees, armed with telephones or 
computers, rapidly pitch deceptive or misleading offers for merchandise and services to 
consumers around the world.  Law enforcement intelligence indicates that many fraudulent 
boiler rooms are lead by recidivist offenders who possess long-term and substantial 
knowledge and experience establishing and overseeing complex boiler room operations, 
developing and approving misleading sales pitches, and directing the movement of illicit 
proceeds among bank accounts.  While many boiler rooms are self-contained independent 
operations, recent law enforcement investigations suggest that more boiler rooms are 
outsourcing certain business functions to specialists and coordinating with criminal groups 
in other countries to broaden the reach of their fraud operations and launder funds.  In 
addition, boiler rooms are increasingly employing countermeasures, including relocating 
frequently and using sophisticated technologies, to conceal their communications and the 
locations from which they operate.  To avoid drawing unwanted law enforcement scrutiny, 
mass-marketing boiler rooms seldom use violence and corruption of individuals or 
businesses, except in rare incidents to discipline group members or further short-term 
objectives.     
 
Law enforcement intelligence reveals regional variations in the types of fraud schemes that 
boiler rooms conduct.  Within the United States and Canada, traditional organized crime 
groups such as La Cosa Nostra, outlaw motorcycle gangs, and other fraudsters use boiler 
rooms to promote illicit lotteries and sweepstakes, high-risk investment schemes, advance-
fee loan and credit card offers, deceptive business opportunities, and fraudulent sales of 
merchandise and services.  Romanian criminal enterprises employ boiler room-like 
structures to perpetrate organized Internet fraud schemes targeting consumers and 
merchants around the world.  In the United Kingdom, the boiler room structure is 
predominately associated with investment frauds involving the fraudulent sale of worthless 
corporate shares.  Israeli boiler rooms have been linked to lottery fraud schemes targeting 
elderly victims.        
As a whole, fraudulent 
mass-marketing 
operations are 
increasingly 
transnational, 
interconnected, and fluid. 
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In contrast to boiler rooms, West African criminal enterprises engaged in mass-marketing 
fraud tend to be fluid, insular operations with few clear lines of communication or 
authority.  These criminal organizations may form along tribal or family-relationship lines 
and appear to be of varying sizes, ranging from entrepreneurial efforts conducted by a few 
individuals with a computer and a cellular telephone to highly-organized operations 
involving many cells that coordinate as necessary to perpetrate one or multiple schemes.  
Recent investigations indicate that multiple cells or individuals can rapidly form criminal 
syndicates, using recommendations from other fraudsters to identify persons or groups that 
can facilitate different aspects of a scam, such as forging checks, mailing documents, 
laundering illicit proceeds, and posing as telephone references to verify a scam’s 
legitimacy. 
 
Such fraud syndicates are attenuated operations, in which conspirators routinely 
communicate via email, have little knowledge of the other participants’ true identities, and 
cease contact at the conclusion of the scam.  These loosely-connected cells are located 
around the world, including in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, North America, and South 
America; indeed, Canadian authorities estimate that more than 100 West African fraud 
groups are currently operating in British Columbia alone.  Moreover, a single fraud 
scheme’s operations can span multiple countries.  Law enforcement intelligence suggests 
that the international dimension of these traditionally non-indigenous groups is evolving, as 
group members - who are drawn almost exclusively from members of the Nigerian or West 
African diaspora - seek permanent residency or citizenship in the countries to which they 
migrate.  Whereas West African fraud groups historically routed illicit proceeds to and 
accepted direction from leaders within their countries of origin, recent intelligence suggests 
that members of such groups are increasingly assimilating into their new environments, 
retaining proceeds for personal use, and directing their own fraudulent operations.   
 
West African criminal enterprises are highly adaptive and opportunistic, perpetrating nearly 
every type of mass-marketing fraud, including the ubiquitous 419 schemes as well as 
lottery, loan, investment, and work-at-home schemes.  The groups often share successful 
fraud techniques with and provide assistance to other cells, a practice that may result in the 
commission of nearly-identical schemes by multiple groups acting in relative independence 
of one another.  They frequently employ individuals with specialized skills to impersonate 
attorneys, government officials, and bankers; design web sites; forge checks; translate 
documents into foreign languages; collect wire transfers; and process incoming and 
outgoing mail.  Many countries, including Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States, have noted the involvement of West African criminal networks in 
drugs and arms smuggling, human trafficking, and the organized export of stolen 
automobiles.  However, the extent to which these criminal networks also engage in fraud is 
not well known, with some intelligence suggesting that fraud proceeds fund other criminal 
activities and other data indicating that fraud groups operate independently from other 
criminal groups.   
 
The formal, efficiently-structured boiler room and the fluid, loosely-connected West 
African criminal network, while well-known to law enforcement investigators, represent 
just two of the many types of groups that perpetrate mass-marketing fraud.  For example, 
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United States intelligence has identified the existence of less-structured boiler rooms, 
sometimes called “rip-and-tear rooms,” which may arise when traditional boiler rooms 
close or when experienced telemarketers decide to become independent operators.  Rip-
and-tear rooms tend to be highly mobile, operating out of vehicles and hotel rooms, 
communicating with victims via cellular telephone and wireless Internet services, and 
collecting victims’ funds from wire transfer outlets.  Canadian and United States law 
enforcement investigations have also identified virtual criminal enterprises that consist of 
individuals around the world who only communicate via online forums yet engage in 
organized fraud schemes and identity theft. 
Methods of Contacting Victims 
 
Fraudulent mass-marketers reach victims via all modes of communication – postal service, 
telephone, e-mail, Internet sites, television, radio, and in some cases even in person.  Victim 
reporting reveals that Internet-based solicitations are among the most common: in the 
United States, web sites and e-mails accounted for 60 percent of reported contacts in 2009, 
and Canada noted a 46 percent spike in Internet-related complaints from 2008 to 2009.30  
Nearly 70 percent of Australian victims reported fraudulent contact via the Internet.31
 
  In 
addition to serving as a primary method of contact, the Internet is also an effective tool for 
identifying potential victims.  Law enforcement intelligence reveals perpetrators’ increasing 
use of email spiders, which crawl through web sites, message boards, and other online 
forums to harvest email addresses for subsequent solicitation via spam email.  Once the 
email addresses have been collected, fraudsters often employ botnets - networks of 
computers infected with malicious code and programmed to follow the directions of a 
common command-and-control server – to facilitate the simultaneous distribution of 
thousands of spam emails.   Perpetrators also pose as buyers and sellers on online auction 
web sites, upload fake jobs to employment web sites, and create bogus user accounts on 
social networking and dating web sites to target new victims and initiate fraud schemes 
under the guise of legitimacy.  While the majority of recipients deletes or ignores Internet-
based solicitations, their widespread distribution ensures that some recipients will believe 
the messages to be credible and respond accordingly.  In addition, some recipients may 
perceive the email solicitations to be fraudulent but respond anyway, thereby validating 
their email addresses to the fraudsters and increasing the likelihood of future fraudulent 
solicitations. 
Telephone-initiated solicitations remain among the most widely-reported and profitable 
methods by which fraudsters contact victims.  For example, 30 percent of Canadian 
complainants in 2009 reported that perpetrators contacted them via the telephone.32  Law 
enforcement intelligence reveals fraudsters’ use of sophisticated telephone technology, 
including VoIP and platform numbers, to create the appearance that they are operating 
within specific cities and countries.  While nearly all fraud groups use the telephone to 
contact victims, boiler rooms specialize in the process of outbound telemarketing, 
purchasing lead lists and then cold-calling potential victims to induce the purchase of goods 
or services or to solicit a charitable contribution.  Boiler rooms also engage in inbound 
telemarketing through the dissemination of advertisements and promotional materials, often 
promising awards and prizes for participation.  These promised (but nonexistent) awards 
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and prizes are designed to entice victims to contact the boiler rooms.  Once prospective 
victims call in, telemarketers subject them to fraudulent or deceptive sales pitches.   In 
contrast to outbound telemarketing rooms, which typically experience high rates of 
rejection when they initially contact prospective victims, inbound telemarketing efforts tend 
to produce the opposite effect.  Those individuals who initiate contact with the boiler 
rooms, although a fraction of those who received the promotional materials, are often more 
inclined to accede to the telemarketers’ sales pitches. 
Critical Resources for Mass-Marketing Fraud Operations 
 
Viable mass-marketing fraud groups require a variety of resources to operate, including the 
means to target and communicate with prospective victims, obtain and launder illicit 
proceeds, and evade law enforcement detection and investigation.  These include the 
following:  
 
• Legitimate Business Services.  Operators of mass-marketing fraud schemes 
increasingly employ certain services of legitimate and semi-legitimate businesses, 
which may or may not be aware of the underlying fraud, to perform critical 
functions.  Law enforcement intelligence reveals fraudsters’ use of mailing houses 
to print, package, and ship counterfeit documents.  To conceal the locations from 
which they operate, fraudsters may contract with virtual office companies, which 
provide accommodation addresses, collect mail, and forward telephone calls.  Many 
fraud groups, especially boiler rooms that use deceptive and misleading pitches to 
sell products, employ customer service and fulfillment centers to receive customer 
complaints, discourage refund requests, and package and ship worthless or low-
quality merchandise. 
 
• Lead Lists.  Fraud perpetrators purchase customized “lead lists” –sometimes  
known as “sucker lists” by fraudsters – that contain individuals’ names and contact 
information compiled according to myriad demographic criteria, from direct 
marketing companies and leads lists brokers, some of which perform minimal or no 
verification of the legitimacy of the groups or persons who order the lists.  In 
addition to sorting leads by age, income, and occupation, some list brokers also 
identify individuals, such as sweepstakes participants, who may be unusually 
vulnerable to deceptive solicitations.  Lead lists are also available for purchase via 
online black markets, including full data leads containing individuals’ financial 
account numbers and lists of  chronic fraud victims, who repeatedly participate in 
new fraud schemes despite the protective efforts of friends, family, and law 
enforcement. 
 
• Payment Processors. Illicit boiler rooms often engage the services of payment 
processors, typically processors that are well aware of the true nature of the boiler 
rooms’ operations, to facilitate the collection of victim funds via non-cash 
processes, such as bank debits, remotely-created checks, and credit card charges. 
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• Communications Tools.  All mass-marketing fraud groups, regardless of their level 
of sophistication, require access to communication tools and networks.  Law 
enforcement investigations have revealed perpetrators’ use of calling cards, cellular 
phones, and pre-paid SIM cards, the disposable nature of which hinders law 
enforcement efforts to determine users’ identities.  West African fraud groups 
employ free web-based email accounts, frequent multiple Internet cafes, and use 
Internet phones and other devices that supply instantaneous Internet connections to 
undermine investigative efforts to trace Internet Protocol addresses.  Large scale 
boiler rooms are investing in sophisticated computer systems and storing servers in 
other countries, trusting that the complexity of cross-border cases deters law 
enforcement investigation.  Recent investigations indicate that fraudsters manipulate 
the caller identification features of Internet-based technology, including VoIP and 
platform numbers, to create the appearance of operating within victims’ cities or 
countries rather than from overseas locations 
 
• Fraudulent Identification Documents. Fraudulent identification documents are 
among the most essential tools in a fraudster’s arsenal.  Counterfeit passports, 
driver’s licenses, and work permits enable perpetrators to open bank accounts under 
assumed names, collect packages from courier services, obtain telephone service to 
contact victims, and rent properties to house fraud operations.  Fraudsters  routinely 
use multiple generic “pitch names” (names of nonexistent people) to communicate 
with and collect illicit proceeds from different victims, a technique that requires the 
possession of fraudulent identification documents to support each fake persona.  
Law enforcement intelligence has revealed that a single perpetrator may use 
hundreds of fraudulent identities and multiple perpetrators may use one common 
identity, undermining law enforcement efforts to locate perpetrators and intercept 
fraudulent wire transfers. 
 
• Counterfeit Financial Instruments.  
Mass-marketing fraud criminals continue to 
use counterfeit financial instruments, 
including checks and money orders, to 
facilitate many mass-marketing schemes, 
including overpayment, lottery, and 
employment fraud.  Illicit mass-marketers 
use sophisticated software, commercial 
laser printers and scanners, and blank check 
stock to produce the fake checks and 
money orders.  The counterfeit documents 
lack security features, but many closely resemble legitimate financial instruments 
and are of sufficient quality to deceive unwitting consumers and bank personnel.  
Although customs, postal, and law enforcement agencies have identified packages 
of counterfeit checks addressed to victims around the world, the fraudulent 
instruments appear to have the greatest impact on Canadian and US victims, who 
routinely use checks for personal and business purposes.   In contrast, European 
Mass-marketing fraud 
criminals continue to use 
counterfeit financial 
instruments, including 
checks and money 
orders, to facilitate many 
mass-marketing schemes. 
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consumers and businesses rarely use checks for any purpose and may view the 
unsolicited delivery of such instruments with greater skepticism. 
 
With respect to U.S. consumers in particular, fraudsters’ use of counterfeit checks 
exploits a general lack of knowledge about United States banking laws, which allow 
rapid access to funds from most check deposits, often before a bank has confirmed 
the legitimacy of the checks.  Many account holders interpret this availability of 
funds as an indication that a check is legitimate, and they follow perpetrators’ 
instructions to withdraw and wire transfer all or a portion of the money overseas for 
payment of taxes, fees, and other expenses.  Law enforcement intelligence indicates 
that fraud perpetrators routinely send counterfeit financial instruments through 
myriad countries and alternate their routes and shipment methods to circumvent law 
enforcement and customs investigations.  Recent investigations by Nigerian 
authorities have resulted in the arrest of check-carrying couriers preparing to board 
flights to South Africa, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States, and in the seizure of bulk packages of checks destined for reshippers 
in France, Italy, and Spain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Methods of Evading Law Enforcement 
 
Operators of mass-marketing fraud schemes are highly adaptive, rapidly changing their 
methods and techniques to reduce the risks of law enforcement detection and investigation 
and to respond to consumer and business awareness of their current methods.  Perpetrators 
routinely employ generic “pitch names,” assume the identities of legitimate organizations 
and high-profile individuals, create fraudulent email accounts to support fake identities, and 
use fraudulent identification documents.  Many fraud groups promote multiple deceptive 
and illicit offers, often at the same time, and may easily switch to new promotions should 
older promotions start to generate significant complaints or unwelcome attention. 
Stack of Counterfeit Postal Service Money Orders Seized 
by U.S. Immigration and Customs, 2009 [Source: ICE] 
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Fraudsters often widely share effective fraud schemes and recycle pitch names with other 
groups, complicating law enforcement efforts to identify the perpetrators responsible for 
specific schemes and victims.  Fraud schemes typically emphasize the need for urgency and 
secrecy in all transactions, restrictions that prevent victims from verifying a solicitation’s 
legitimacy and isolate them from the protective efforts of family and friends.  Mass-marketing 
fraud groups tend to operate as fully independent or semi-autonomous ventures, 
cooperating and sharing information on an ad-hoc and need-to-know basis, so that law 
enforcement disruption of one room or cell does not destroy the entire fraudulent operation.  
Furthermore, the owners, coordinators, and leaders may be the most difficult to identify and 
prosecute, as they may not be closely involved in the day-to-day operations of the boiler 
rooms or groups.   
 
Mass-marketing perpetrators often route their communications, operations, and illicit 
proceeds through multiple states and countries to complicate investigations and hinder 
timely information sharing.  Fraud groups typically use communication methods that are 
difficult to trace, including “disposable” cellular phones, subscriber identity module (SIM) 
cards, and VoIP services.  Intelligence reveals perpetrators’ increasing use of Internet 
phones and other devices that enable perpetrators to access the Internet via cellular 
networks, undermining law enforcement efforts to identify perpetrators’ locations.  
Fraudulent proceeds often flow through cash-based systems, such as Western Union and 
MoneyGram, and bank accounts in countries with strict bank secrecy laws, rendering law 
enforcement efforts to trace the funds a difficult, if not impossible, task.  Although a single 
fraudulent mass-marketing operation may acquire millions of dollars from its victims, 
perpetrators deliberately target victims in diverse locations, knowing that the losses to 
victims in any one jurisdiction may be deemed insufficient to warrant law enforcement 
investigation.  Many groups outsource key functions, such as mail distribution, mail 
processing, money retrieval, and money laundering, to criminal facilitators in multiple 
countries to minimize law enforcement efforts to disrupt the fraudulent operations.  
Perpetrators also establish operations in foreign countries in which the challenges to 
investigation and prosecution are likely to be great, due to political, social, economic, and 
even language barriers.  The organizations frequently operate with substantially-greater 
flexibility than law enforcement and may simply close and reopen elsewhere once 
authorities have surmounted such barriers to investigation. 
Identity Theft and Money Laundering 
 
Identity theft and money laundering continue to be critical components of various mass-
marketing fraud schemes.  When criminals purchase lead lists, including “full data” leads 
containing consumers’ sensitive personal and financial information, from lead lists brokers 
and other fraud groups, and use those names without the authorization of those consumer, 
they are engaging in identity theft or identity fraud.  Law enforcement intelligence has 
revealed mass-marketers’ purchase of data from illicit online carding sites that trade in 
consumer data stolen via database breaches, phishing schemes, and other illegal methods.   
Mass-marketing perpetrators also commit identity theft to further scam operations, by 
counterfeiting and printing legitimate company or government checks to defraud 
consumers, illegally accessing business accounts at private courier services to purchase 
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postage and mail documents, and creating counterfeit identification to collect victims’ 
funds.  Once in possession of victims’ funds, fraudulent mass-marketers exploit informal 
and formal financial systems, including money service businesses, domestic and 
international banks, shell company accounts, and underground money transfer systems, to 
conceal the destinations and beneficiaries of the illicit proceeds. 
 
Like all successful criminal enterprises, mass-marketing fraudsters take great care to 
conceal the origins, beneficiaries, destinations, and uses of their proceeds and to impede 
authorities’ efforts to track and seize the funds.  Recent mass-marketing fraud 
investigations reveal that fraudsters continue to request victim payments via cash-based 
methods, including checks, money orders, paper currency hidden within magazines and 
cards, and commercial wire transfer services, as well as bank debits, bank transfers, and 
credit card charges. 
 
Fraudulent mass-marketers vary their choice of payment method according to the demands 
of particular schemes and the perceived advantages or vulnerabilities associated with each 
method.  They seek payment methods that produce and maintain the fewest records, allow 
for the rapid attainment of funds, and enhance a scheme’s legitimacy, thereby encouraging 
victim participation.  Law enforcement has noted, for example, that boiler rooms engaged 
in investment fraud predominantly use bank transfers to collect victims’ funds, likely 
because bank transfers enable the processing of high payment amounts and appear credible 
in the eyes of educated and affluent victims whom these schemes often target.  In contrast, 
West African fraud groups commonly request payment via wire transfers, which produce 
minimal documentation, can often be collected with forged identification, and may be 
rapidly retrieved from nearly any location.  
 
Law enforcement intelligence suggests that once victims have remitted payment, the illicit 
funds often begin a complex voyage through multiple countries before reaching their final 
destinations.  Despite extensive law enforcement efforts to track victim funds, perpetrators’ 
use of complex payment methods and multiple jurisdictions complicates efforts to identify 
the ultimate beneficiaries and uses of fraudulent funds.  Law enforcement intelligence 
suggests that perpetrators use much of the money for personal enrichment, purchasing 
property, securities, and automobiles, or to open new businesses such as Internet cafes to 
facilitate fraud schemes.  Despite anecdotal evidence that suggests some perpetrators use 
fraud proceeds to finance other criminal ventures such as narcotics and weapons trafficking, 
law enforcement investigations have produced little reliable information to support these 
allegations to date.    
      
Fraudulent mass-marketers often engage the services of legitimate businesses, other 
criminal enterprises, and criminal facilitators to launder illicit proceeds.  Canadian and U.S. 
authorities have recently disrupted an extensive network of corrupt and collusive 
MoneyGram and Western Union agents who fraudulently obtained operating licenses for 
the sole purpose of rapidly receiving and laundering victims’ funds; new intelligence 
suggests that perpetrators are adapting to these law enforcement actions by diverting victim 
payments to corrupt wire transfer counters in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.  Other 
fraud groups, including West Africans and Romanians, employ low-level criminals and 
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immigrants armed with counterfeit identification to collect fraudulent payments from 
legitimate money transfer agents and financial institutions. 
 
Law enforcement intelligence also reveals perpetrators’ use of shell company accounts, 
some of which are operated by criminal enterprises that specialize in money laundering, 
located at financial institutions in Asia, the Caribbean, and the Middle East.  Intelligence 
suggests that many of these accounts are long-established money laundering accounts, 
which are used to receive and process wire transfers for many different fraud groups and 
schemes.  West African fraud groups have also developed networks of complicit account 
holders, who typically retain a percentage of the profits in exchange for allowing 
perpetrators to access and use their bank accounts to collect victim funds.  Law 
enforcement investigations have revealed trade-based money laundering via legitimate and 
semi-legitimate merchants, including automobile dealers, cellular telephone suppliers, and 
electronics stores, which accept victims’ funds as payment for products to be exported to 
Nigeria and other countries.  While many of the merchants are ignorant of the fraudulent 
sources of such payments, some fraudsters operate retail businesses to serve as fronts for 
the laundering of illicit fraud proceeds.  Nigerian authorities have also noted West African 
fraud groups’ use of the hawala informal banking system to move funds from the 
Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom to beneficiaries in Nigeria.    
       
One disturbing trend is the increasing exploitation 
of fraud victims to receive and launder victim 
funds, or to receive and disburse counterfeit 
financial instruments.  A typical mass-marketing 
fraud scheme, for example, may recruit 
individuals to work in such varied capacities as 
collecting wire transfers, depositing checks or 
shipping counterfeit checks to other victims, 
accepting deliveries of merchandise purchased 
with stolen credit cards, forwarding funds and 
products overseas, and serving as business 
account agents for foreign companies.  In 
addition, recent investigations have uncovered a number of victims, who lost thousands or 
tens of thousands of dollars to one or more fraud schemes, and who then appear to 
knowingly participate in mass-marketing fraud schemes.  Even after warnings from law 
enforcement or attempted interventions by family members, these victims risk criminal 
charges to collect fraudulent wire transfers from or ship counterfeit checks to other victims. 
One disturbing trend is 
the increasing 
exploitation of fraud 
victims to receive and 
launder victim funds, 
or to receive and 
disburse counterfeit 
financial instruments. 
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Use of Threats and Violence 
 
While most mass-marketing fraud schemes are 
nonviolent in nature, law enforcement intelligence 
reveals that some fraud groups employ threats and 
coercive tactics against uncooperative victims, rival 
groups, and their own group members.  Victims 
have reported that persons posing as law 
enforcement or government officials have 
threatened arrest, imprisonment, or the seizure of 
bank accounts and assets should they fail to comply 
with fraudsters’ demands.  Within the United States, victims of an online extortion scheme 
have received e-mails containing pictures of dead bodies and threatening bodily harm.33
 
  
However, actual incidents of physical harm to victims are exceedingly rare, with very few 
exceptions in which victims traveled to meet with or search for mass-marketing criminals.  
In many such cases, insufficient evidence exists to establish whether the violent crimes 
were linked to the fraud schemes or whether the victims were simply in the wrong places at 
the wrong times. 
Recent law enforcement intelligence suggests that 
use of mass-marketing related intra- and inter-
group violence is on the rise in some places.  Open-
source and law enforcement reporting indicate that 
competing gangs in Jamaica are using murder and 
other violent tactics to steal victim leads lists and 
lottery fraud proceeds.34  In the United States, the 
operators of a New York-based stock boiler room affiliated with two Italian organized 
crime families admitted to controlling and disciplining employees with threats and actual 
violence, including beatings, stabbings, and kidnappings.35
 
  Nigerian authorities report that, 
while violent intra-group conflict may arise over the sharing of fraud proceeds, such acts 
are seldom reported to law enforcement, hindering efforts to gauge the extent of the 
violence. 
Use of mass-marketing 
related intra- and inter-
group violence is on the 
rise in some places. 
Some fraud groups 
employ threats and 
coercive tactics against 
uncooperative victims, 
rival groups, and their 
own group members. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
International mass-marketing fraud, in all of its constantly evolving forms, poses a serious 
threat to individuals, businesses, and financial institutions around the world.  Fraud 
perpetrators exploit global financial systems, communications networks, and markets to 
defraud victims, launder illicit proceeds, conceal the locations from which they operate, and 
engage legitimate businesses as unwitting conspirators in their criminal activities.  
Organized crime groups increasingly initiate, facilitate, and profit from mass-marketing 
fraud, using persuasion and manipulation to steal substantial amounts of money, estimated 
in the tens of billions of dollars worldwide, from vulnerable consumers.  Mass-marketing 
fraud groups are highly adaptive, altering schemes and techniques to evade law 
enforcement scrutiny and respond to consumer awareness of fraud schemes. 
 
To counter this threat effectively, investigative, law enforcement, and regulatory authorities 
in multiple countries – whether those countries are used as bases of operations for mass-
marketing fraud schemes, targets of such schemes, or both -- will need to pursue five 
approaches in close coordination: 
 
1. Expansion of their capability to gather and share intelligence on all aspects of 
mass-marketing fraud schemes and their key participants, including ringleaders 
and individuals who provide key services, such as money laundering, that 
facilitate or expand the schemes’ operations.  The sources of such intelligence 
should come from public complaint data, information required to be reported to 
and voluntarily shared with law enforcement and regulatory authorities, 
information developed through criminal and civil investigations in various 
jurisdictions, and survey and other statistical data. 
 
2. Development and expansion of capacities for disruption of the operations of 
mass-marketing fraud schemes through lawful means.  This should include the 
seizure of counterfeit financial instruments and documents used in such 
schemes, the use of “lead lists” (i.e., lists of information on persons who have 
been victimized in previous fraud schemes) obtained by law enforcement to 
identify and contact victims, and the seizure and forfeiture of the criminal 
proceeds of such schemes. 
 
3. Expansion of public awareness and education programs to help individuals and 
businesses more readily recognize solicitations by mass-marketing fraud 
schemes and take action to avoid or minimize losses to such schemes. 
 
4. Development of effective measures and structures to more promptly identify and 
support victims of mass-marketing fraud schemes (including intervention 
services or victim-support networks when appropriate) through public- and 
private-sector resources.  This should include enhanced efforts to identify mass-
marketing fraud victims who have suffered financially devastating losses, 
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particularly senior citizens or others who have little or no ability to recoup their 
losses through future employment. 
 
5. Development and expansion of coordinated efforts among investigative, law 
enforcement, and regulatory agencies to use their enforcement powers against 
major mass-marketing fraud schemes.  This should include cooperation among 
authorities at national and transnational levels to prioritize the use of 
enforcement resources against key individuals and operations, to establish 
investigative structures (e.g. joint task forces) best suited to conduct 
investigations of those individuals and operations, to expedite cooperation in 
specific investigations and prosecutions, and to draw on all available lawful 
measures for gathering evidence relevant to those prosecutions. 
 
Each of these approaches has been adopted and used, though in widely varying degrees, by 
various countries.  In combination, and if applied in a consistent manner, these approaches 
provide a firm basis for a fully coordinated multinational response to combating mass-
marketing fraud.
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Appendix 
 
Principal Types of Mass-Marketing Fraud 
 
Mass-marketing fraud encompasses a broad range of fraudulent and deceptive schemes 
designed to separate people and businesses from their property, money, services, or 
information.  Many perpetrators use generic, well-known fraud templates, simply recycling 
and updating schemes that have proven successful in the past, although individual schemes 
may vary in nature, execution, and targeted victim population.  The most effective and 
lucrative scheme variations are often widely replicated, as criminals aim to capitalize on 
victims’ delayed recognition of fraudulent solicitations.  Versions of the following schemes 
are among the most-frequently reported to law enforcement and consumer protection 
agencies in Africa, Australia, Europe, and North America.  
 
• Acquisition and Advertisement Fraud Targeting Businesses:  Businesses remain 
popular targets for fraud schemes, as employees may be less vigilant or capable of 
detecting and protecting against threats to corporate funds, and the amounts of 
money involved in fraudulent business transactions may be larger than schemes 
involving individuals.  Many perpetrators use the “assumed sale” technique, 
misleading businesses to believe that someone within the company authorized a 
purchase, demanding payment for fictitious debts, and using fraudulent invoices and 
payment slips as proof of service.  Perpetrators may also pose as legitimate venders 
or companies’ usual suppliers to solicit the sale of expensive or low-quality office 
products, advertisements in nonexistent or poorly-distributed business directories, 
and poorly-crafted web sites.  Belgian and Dutch authorities have identified 
schemes involving the fraudulent sale of domain names, web addresses, and domain 
extensions at inflated prices. 
 
• Charity Schemes:  Perpetrators of charity fraud schemes exploit sympathetic causes, 
legitimate charities, holiday seasons, and humanitarian, environmental, and other 
disasters to solicit financial contributions.  Instead of using donated funds for their 
stated charity or cause, however, perpetrators retain and use all or most of the 
money for personal enrichment and other improper purposes. 
 
• Counterfeit Check Fraud Schemes (Including Schemes Targeting Attorneys):  A 
variety of mass-marketing fraud schemes, including lottery schemes and online 
auction schemes, commonly use counterfeit checks or counterfeit money orders to 
enhance the perceived legitimacy of a transaction.  Whether sent to a victims as a 
disbursement of lottery winnings or payment for a high-value item such as a car, the 
fraudsters always require that the recipient deposit the check or money order into his 
or her bank account, then transfer a portion of the face amount of the check or 
money order back to them.  Several weeks later, the bank into which the check or 
money order was deposited informs the depositor that the financial instrument was 
counterfeit and holds the depositor liable for the full face value of the instrument. 
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Law enforcement has identified an emerging scheme in which perpetrators are 
targeting attorneys and law firms.  Posing as representatives of foreign companies, 
the perpetrators request legal assistance to collect delinquent payments from 
vendors or customers.  At the behest of the foreign companies, the targeted law 
firms pursue payment from the alleged debtors, receive checks payable to the law 
firms, and forward the balance of the payment, less the firms’ fees, to the 
perpetrators. More recent variations of the scheme involve perpetrators posing as 
individuals seeking resolution of personal injury claims and wives requesting legal 
assistance to collect divorce settlements from their ex-husbands. 
 
• Emergency Assistance Schemes:  Perpetrators, posing as a family member or close 
friend, contact victims with requests for urgent financial assistance, claiming that a 
family member was arrested overseas and requires bail money or a friend had an 
accident and needs funds for emergency medical expenses. 
 
• Foreign Lottery and Sweepstakes Fraud: Perpetrators of lottery, sweepstakes, and 
prize schemes target unwitting individuals with false promises of money or valuable 
items, provided that the victims first purchase certain products or make advance 
payments of fictitious fees and taxes.  Perpetrators often use counterfeit financial 
instruments to enhance these schemes’ appearance of credibility. 
 
• Investment Fraud:  Perpetrators of investment fraud schemes, including penny stock 
schemes, advance-fee recovery schemes, and high-yield investment programs (also 
known as “Ponzi” schemes), target victims with fraudulent promises of high returns 
in exchange for devoting investment funds to the purchase of securities, real estate, 
stakes in oil drilling ventures, coins, gems, and other commodities. 
 
• Merchandise Purchase / Product Misrepresentation Schemes:  Merchandise 
purchase fraud comprises a wide range of schemes that target consumers who 
purchase or attempt to purchase products or services via Internet auction sites, 
catalogs, mail order services, classified advertisements, and other media.  Common 
schemes include perpetrators’ failure to deliver purchased merchandise, delivery of 
purchased goods later than promised, delivery of worthless or significantly less-
valuable items than purchased, and misrepresentation of products’ true conditions.  
While perpetrators can offer any item for sale, analysis of Canadian fraud 
complaints suggests that popular and trendy technologies such as iPhones, laptops, 
digital cameras, and video game consoles are among the most commonly advertised.  
Nigerian and US authorities have identified similar schemes involving the 
fraudulent sale of pets, magazines, office supplies, vacations and timeshares, health 
products, precious stones, and scrap metals.  Some perpetrators send consumers and 
businesses bills for unordered products, demanding payment and threatening legal 
action to collect the fraudulent debt  In another common scheme, perpetrators target 
users of legitimate online auction sites by offering losing bidders a second chance to 
purchase the desired products, provided that the buyers pay via wire transfer or 
other unsecure payment method. 
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• Psychic/Clairvoyant Schemes: Perpetrators of psychic/clairvoyant schemes contact 
victims with offers to make predictions of events that will change victims’ lives, 
provided that the victims pay in advance.  Perpetrators may entice victims with 
predictions of extreme good fortune and threaten bad luck should victims fail to 
comply with the demands for money.   
 
• Recovery Schemes:  Perpetrators of recovery schemes, often posing as lawyers, law 
enforcement officials, or government employees, target prior scam victims with 
offers to facilitate restitution pursuant to the advance payment of administrative and 
other fees. 
 
• Romance Schemes:  Perpetrators of romance schemes target users of Internet dating 
and social networking sites by feigning romantic interest, securing victims’ trust and 
affection through regular intimate conversations and exchanges of gifts, and then 
exploiting the relationship to fraudulently obtain money and valuable merchandise.  
Romance scam victims have reported sending money to facilitate the purchase of 
travel documents and airline tickets, pay for medication and hospital bills, fund 
charitable works programs, and help perpetrators recover from personal financial 
difficulties.  While all mass-marketing schemes take a psychological toll on victims, 
romance schemes often leave victims emotionally devastated. 
 
• Sale of Merchandise / Overpayment Schemes: In “sale of merchandise” or 
overpayment schemes, perpetrators remit fraudulent payments, often in the form of 
a counterfeit or altered monetary instruments, to purchase high-value products or 
services such as cars, computers, or electronic goods.  The monetary instruments are 
generally payable in amounts greater than the products’ advertised prices, and 
perpetrators instruct the sellers to deposit or cash the checks and return the balance 
by wire transfer.  Belgian authorities have noted that criminal exploitation of certain 
online automobile sales sites is so prevalent that sellers now receive almost only 
fraudulent offers, many of which use fake escrow services to enhance the legitimacy 
of the bid.  Perpetrators of other “sale of merchandise” schemes use stolen credit 
cards to purchase high-value retail items; in many cases, the businesses ship the 
products before discovering that the credit cards are stolen. 
 
• Service Schemes: Similar to product misrepresentation schemes, service schemes 
involve false or misleading promotions for services.  Canadian and U.S. victims 
have reported fraudulent offers for local and long-distance telecommunication 
services; Internet services; health and medical services; energy services; automobile 
sales, insurance, and warranties; dating services; immigration and green card 
application services; and financial services, including debt management, credit 
protection, and credit repair programs. 
 
• Traditional West African Fraud Schemes:  Traditional West African fraud schemes, 
often termed “419” frauds after the section of the Nigerian criminal code pertaining 
to fraud, entice victims with promises of immediate and enormous wealth.  
Common West African fraud solicitations include inheritance schemes, in which 
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perpetrators require victims to pay fictitious fees and taxes to claim the nonexistent 
estates of previously-unknown and now-deceased relatives, and black-money 
schemes that solicit victims to purchase special cleansers to remove dye from paper 
currency that has, for various reasons, been blackened and rendered unusable.  
Perpetrators of funds transfer schemes claim to need a victim’s financial assistance 
to transfer or embezzle money, often millions of dollars, from a foreign country or 
company in exchange for a portion of the stolen funds. 
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1   See U.S. Department of Justice Press Release (January 12, 2010) (sentencing of Ponzi 
scheme operator who used telephone, mail, investment seminars, and personal meetings 
with victims), available at http://losangeles.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/la011210.htm. 
 
2  In Canada, victims may report fraud to the Canadian Anti-Fraud Call Centre (managed by 
the Ontario Provincial Police, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the Competition 
Bureau Canada) and Reporting Economic Crime Online (which uses the acronym RECOL 
and is administered by the National White Collar Crime Centre of Canada).  In the United 
States, victims may report fraud to the Federal Trade Commission’s Consumer Sentinel and 
the Internet Crime Complaint Center, a partnership between the National White Collar 
Crime Center, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Bureau of Justice Assistance.  In 
the United Kingdom, the National Fraud Reporting Centre is slated to become operational 
in 2010.  In Belgium, citizens may contact eCops, an online reporting center administered 
by the Ministry of Economy and the Federal Computer Crimes Unit, to report online 
crimes, including spam emails, in which they have not been victimized.  Belgium 
anticipates that eCops will accept official complaints beginning in 2010 or 2011; however, 
current fraud victims must still contact local law enforcement agencies to file official 
complaints.     
 
3  See Competition Bureau Canada, 2007 Canadian Consumer Mass Marketing Fraud 
Survey (February 2008), available at http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ic1.nsf/vwapj/Environics-
Competition%20Bureau-MMF-FinalRReport-Feb2008.pdf/$file/Environics-
Competition%20Bureau-MMF-FinalRReport-Feb2008.pdf. 
 
4  Office of Fair Trading, Research on impact of mass-marketed scams: A summary of 
research into the impact of scams on UNITED KINGDOM consumers (December 2006), 
available at http://www.oft.gov.UnitedKingdom/shared_oft/reports/ 
consumer_protection/oft883.pdf. 
 
5  See id. 
 
6   See Australian Bureau of Statistics, Personal Fraud, 2007 (June 27, 2008), available at 
http://www.abs.gov.au. 
 
7  See Federal Trade Commission, Consumer Fraud in the United States: The Second FTC 
Survey (October 2007), available at  http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/10/fraud.pdf. 
 
8   With respect to Australia, Australian Bureau of Statistics data show that as of June 30, 
2007, the estimated resident population 15 years and older was 16,939,731.  Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, Australian Demographic Statistics, December Quarter 2007 (June 24, 
2008), available at http://www.abs.gov.au.  Using an estimated population of  230,173,211 
U.S. adults, 5 percent of that population would be approximately 11,508,660.  That latter  
total would be 14.279 times the size of the Australian population  of 806,000 victims, and 
25.4 times the 453,100 Australian victims who reported losses.  Multiplying the total  
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Australian losses of AU $977 million (U.S. $905.7 million) by 25.4 equals US $23.004 
billion.  With respect to the United Kingdom, 6.5 percent of the 2008 U.S. population 
would be 14,961,259.  That total would be 4.675 times greater than the U.K. victim 
population.  Multiplying £3.5 billion by 4.675 would equal £16.36 billion, or US $24.65 
billion. 
 
9  See Federal Trade Commission, Consumer Sentinel Network Data Book for January – 
December 2009 at 7 (February 2010),  available at http://www.ftc.gov/sentinel/ 
reports/sentinel-annual-reports/sentinel-cy2009.pdf. 
 
10  Id. at 7 n.2.  In contrast, 267 consumers in 2007 and 257 consumers in 2008, 
respectively, reported that they had lost $1 million or more to consumer fraud.  Id. 
 
11  See Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre, Annual Statistic Report 2009: Mass-Marketing Fraud 
and ID Theft Activities, available at www.phonebusters.com/english/documents/ 
AnnualStatisticalReport2009_001.pdf. 
 
12  See Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Targeting Scams: Report of the 
ACCC on Scam Activity 2009 (March 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/item.phtml?itemId=916075&nodeId=3742e183615bf4c0b1
38d4d1a165232d&fn=Targeting%20scams%202009.pdf 
 
13  See Competition Bureau Canada, 2007 Canadian Consumer Mass Marketing Fraud 
Survey (February 2008), available at http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ic1.nsf/vwapj/Environics-
Competition%20Bureau-MMF-FinalRReport-Feb2008.pdf/$file/Environics-
Competition%20Bureau-MMF-FinalRReport-Feb2008.pdf. 
 
14  See Massive Taiwanese-led phone scam uncovered, 94 arrests, Chiang Mai Mail, July 
28 – August 3, 2009, available at http://www.chiangmai-mail.com/336/. 
 
15  See Curt Anderson, AP: Ponzi collapses nearly quadrupled in '09, Boston.com, 
December 28, 2009, available at http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2009/12/28/ 
ap_ponzi_collapses_more_than_tripled_in_09/  
 
16  See Associated Press, 50-Year Term for Minnesota Man in $3.7 Billion Ponzi Fraud, 
New York Times, April 8, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/09/ 
business/09ponzi.html . 
 
17   See, e.g., Warren Richey, How Scott Rothstein rode $1.2 billion Ponzi scheme to wealth 
and power, Christian Science Monitor, January 27, 2010, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0127/How-Scott-Rothstein-rode-1.2-billion-Ponzi-
scheme-to-wealth-and-power; U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release (April 15, 2009), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/April/09-crm-352.html. 
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18  See Nick O’Malley, Warrant issued over $1.5b alleged fraud, Sydney Morning Herald, 
November 5, 2009, available at http://www.smh.com.au/national/warrant-issued-over-15b-
alleged-fraud-20091105-hybh.html. 
 
19  See AARP Foundation, Off the Hook: Reducing Participation in Telemarketing Fraud 
(2003), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/consume/d17812_fraud.pdf.  In general, 
fraud losses tend to vary by scam type.  For example, the United Kingdom and other 
countries have noted that one-time schemes such as prize draws, sweepstakes, and Internet 
auction fraud generally result in smaller loss amounts.  In contrast, lotteries, investment 
frauds, and dating schemes, which are recurrent and sophisticated schemes that require 
victims to place long-term trust in perpetrators, accrue significant losses spanning multiple 
payments.  Many countries, including Belgium, Canada, and the United States, have 
reported that complaints and investigations of Internet fraud schemes have risen in recent 
years. 
 
20  See Wesley Johnson, Briton suffers 'romance fraud' kidnap ordeal, Independent, January 
12, 2010, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/briton-suffers-
romance-fraud-kidnap-ordeal-1865551.html; Dan Goodin, Irish man rescued after falling 
for 419 scam, The Register, November 1, 2007, available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/ 
2007/11/01/419_victim_rescued/. 
 
21  See Seven in court for 419 scam kidnapping, South Africa Dispatch, October 1, 2008, 
available at http://www.dispatch.co.za/article.aspx?id=255017. 
 
22  See Office of Fair Trading, Research on impact of mass-marketed scams: A summary of 
research into the impact of scams on United Kingdom consumers (December 2006), 
available at http://www.oft.gov.UnitedKingdom/shared_oft/reports/ 
consumer_protection/oft883.pdf. 
 
23   Certain mass-marketing fraudsters – most notably, Ponzi scheme operators – often 
conduct their schemes in the same jurisdictions as their intended victims,  See, e.g., Melissa 
Grace, Set of identical twins busted in long-term $2M investment scam, New York Daily 
News, December 30, 2009, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/money/2009/ 
12/30/2009-12-30_twins_busted_in_2m_invest_scam.html; Justin McCurry, Arrests made 
in what could be biggest investment scam in Japanese history, Guardian, February 5, 2009, 
available at http://www.guardian.co.United Kingdom/business/2009/feb/05/japan-
kazutsugi-nami-ladies-gentlemen. 
 
24  See 9 Cameroonians arrested for fraud, Shenzhen Daily, March 19, 2010, available at 
http://szdaily.sznews.com/html/2009-03/19/content_554261.htm.  The growth of mass-
marketing fraud groups in other African countries may be due, in part, to enhanced 
enforcement efforts within Nigeria in the last decade.  During that period, Nigerian law 
enforcement and postal authorities collaborated with foreign police and customs agencies to 
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“Montego Bay Scam Investigation in US,” The Jamaica Gleaner, 25 November 2007, 
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20090309/news/news2.html. 
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